



The Competitive Performance of






Anthony M. SantomeroTHE WHARTON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CENTER
The Wharton Financial Institutions Center provides a multi-disciplinary research approach to
the problems and opportunities facing the financial services industry in its search for
competitive excellence.  The Center's research focuses on the issues related to managing risk
at the firm level as well as ways to improve productivity and performance.
The Center fosters the development of a community of faculty, visiting scholars and Ph.D.
candidates whose research interests complement and support the mission of the Center.  The
Center works closely with industry executives and practitioners to ensure that its research is
informed by the operating realities and competitive demands facing industry participants as
they pursue competitive excellence.
Copies of the working papers summarized here are available from the Center.  If you would
like to learn more about the Center or become a member of our research community, please
let us know of your interest.
Anthony M. Santomero
Director
The Working Paper Series is made possible by a generous
grant from the Alfred P. Sloan FoundationHarris Chorney and Jill Goldman are at KPMG Peat Marwick LLP.  Olivia S. Mitchell and Anthony M.
1
Santomero are at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
The Competitive Performance of Life Insurance Firms
in the Retirement Asset Market
1
April 1997
This study is part of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center-KPMG Peat Marwick
project on the Retirement Asset Market.1
INTRODUCTION
At $4.6 trillion in assets and reserves, the private retirement asset market is massive. It is growing both
absolutely and relatively.  Tens of thousands of workers are currently dependent on it, both directly and
indirectly, for their livelihood.  Millions more are dependent upon it for their future.
As the U.S. financial services industry prepares for rapid growth in the private retirement market, life
insurers appear to be well-poised to meet consumers’ rising needs for individual asset accumulation,
decumulation, and risk protection products.  At the same time, insurers must also meet competitive
concerns arising from the entrance of new market players seeking to capture their own share of retirement
dollars.
Many industry observers view life insurance firms as once-dominant players, now losing presence to new
competitors in the retirement market.  Mutual funds are seen as having attracted many general investors
as well as those just beginning to plan for retirement.  Additionally, banks also appear to be gaining
ground, joining the combatants in the war for retirement assets.
In this paper, we report on the results of two studies examining the retirement asset market.  These are
part of an ongoing project examining the competitive position of insurance companies in this dynamic and
changing financial sector, conducted jointly by the Wharton Financial Institutions Center and Peat
Marwick LLP (KPMG). Our overview here will take a short but objective look at the place of life
insurance companies and their products in the retirement asset market.  We survey the available data on
the size of the market, its required growth to accomplish the aim of satisfactory living standards for the
future generation of retirees, and the critical factors for life insurer success in this attractive asset market.2
The purpose of our effort is two-fold.  First, it is to better comprehend consumer behavior relative to the
accumulation and decumulation of assets.  We ask whether consumers are saving adequately, where they
are placing their money, and what specific products appeal to them.  The larger study on this topic is
described by Mitchell and Moore in a report available from both KPMG and the Wharton Financial
Institutions Center.1 The second  objective of our work is to provide a macro view of retirement asset flow:
where assets are flowing institutionally, who have been the largest winners and losers thus far in the
process, and how product mix affects competitiveness.  Again, a fuller treatment of these issues can be
found in a report by Hoffman and Santomero also available from KPMG and the Wharton Financial
Institutions Center.2  Our goal in the present discussion is to offer an overview of the findings contained
in these studies, so that the industry might both understand the trends and identify the opportunities
offered in this market.
Specifically, our research points to several key findings.
1)  Household asset accumulation is currently considerably less than would be required for
adequate retirement income. By any measure, large segments of the American population
have accumulated far less than needed to meet replacement rate targets.
 
2)  The household sector has little understanding of retirement asset needs and the complexities
of the financial market.  Yet, financial education alters retirement accumulation behavior in
a constructive way. In short, education increases retirement savings.
 
3)  Many households do not decumulate retirement assets optimally.  Advice sought regarding
decumulation options is often  ad hoc and rarely expert. As a result, people are probably
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Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper, 1997.
2 See Paul Hoffman and Anthony Santomero, “ Life Insurance Firms In the Retirement Market: Is the
News All Bad”.  Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper, 1997.3
buying too few life annuities with their retirement wealth, and may overpurchase term
certain annuities when they do annuitize.
 
4)  The retirement asset market itself is growing rapidly, however, as “baby-boomers” appear to
be saving more rapidly than their parents (at the same stage in their life cycle).
 
5)  The retirement products used by this generation have shifted substantially, such that:
a)  defined benefit plans within the pension asset category are declining both as a
percentage of wealth, and as a percentage of retirement assets;
b)  corporate pensions of the traditional defined benefit type are declining in favor of
participant directed accounts including Individual Retirement Account (IRA) and
401(k) plans;
c)  annuities, offered primarily by insurance companies, have grown in importance
relative to wealth, but have been slipping as a percentage of retirement assets.
6)  The observed growth in mutual fund market share has been primarily at the expense of
depository institutions, most notably in IRA and 401(k) assets.
These results and their implications are discussed at further length below.
ARE CONSUMERS SAVING ENOUGH ?
In addressing the question of whether people are saving enough, and what determines their saving
patterns, it is worth noting that it is extraordinarily difficult to find out about Americans’ saving rates and
wealth levels.  In fact, it is only recently that the inherently imperfect exercise of measuring wealth has
become easier because of newly devised, quite elaborate, survey instruments described by Mitchell and4
Moore.   Another methodological issue is that determining how much retirement wealth is sufficient is
somewhat controversial, since there are many different benchmarks against which household saving can
be compared.  While there is no single and simple “right”  benchmark applicable to all people in every
circumstance, the data suggest that some intriguing things are occurring in this market
Asset Accumulation
One invaluable source of data on retirement asset accumulation is the new Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), a survey of over 7,600 households with at least one family member between the age of 51 and 61.
At first glance, evidence from the HRS would seem to indicate that people near retirement are in a fairly
comfortable position, once social security benefits and pension assets are included.   Nevertheless the
picture is not so rosy when we project people’s assets to retirement age, and then compare what they will
have to what they will need in retirement.   Our estimates show that the median older American
household faces a large saving task ahead, needing to save on the order of a quarter to a third of  total
annual income, in order to meet conventional replacement rate standards.  Why, then, do households save
too little?
One potential explanation is that some people simply might not be able to afford to save.  This might be
true, for instance, if income barely covers a subsistence level of consumption.  However this view is not
likely to hold for other than the poorest of the poor in the U.S.
A second possible explanation for undersaving recognizes the inherent difficulty of solving the
household’s planning problem.  Many issues must be considered and assumptions made about inherently
uncertain future variables including future income streams, interest rates to be earned on various asset
classes, tax rates and issues, future inflation rates, and mortality.   Also, calculated saving rates are quite
sensitive to changes in assumptions, and people may disagree on what these assumptions should be.5
In recent months various experts have begun to investigate whether people are able to forecast the future
with any useful degree of accuracy.  One researcher, Douglas Bernheim,  finds American households
sorely lacking in financial knowledge.  He then links this financial illiteracy to underpreparation for
retirement, and concludes that such ignorance may be depressing national saving rates.
Another rationale for too little saving may be lack of self control, a theme explored by Richard Thaler and
colleagues.  This theory contends that people face a conflict between a desire for immediate gratification
versus a forward-looking need to save for the future.  The psychological perspective asserts that people
develop so-called “mental accounts,” and treat money differently depending on which account it is
attached to.  Thus some income surprises tend to be consumed immediately, while others tend to be  saved
for future consumption.  Thaler argues that people need to have funds deposited automatically through
payroll deductions or mandatory saving of tax refunds, in order to achieve retirement accumulations of the
desired magnitude.
 In sum, analysts offer several different explanations for low saving rates.   The relative importance of
each of these reasons – lack of substantial income, poor understanding of financial issues, psychological
issues, or the unintended influences of government programs – is the subject of much active and ongoing
research.
Tax Inducements and Employer Education
Tax inducements via IRAs, 401(k)s, and other programs do seem to motivate some people to save for
retirement, although to what degree is still a matter of dispute.  Recent changes to IRA contribution limits
increasing deductibility for couples, as well as proposals by the Administration to further raise
contribution limits, will provide natural experiments to help sort out the value of these deductions.6
Another very promising development is that employers across the country have begun to find new ways
to get employees to save for retirement within the venue of company-sponsored pension plans.  One
approach is to have employers offer financial education programs that have a strong positive effect on
workers’ saving patterns.  Specifically, where employer-sponsored retirement education is provided, plan
participation is higher, and median 401(k) balances in pension plans are almost two-thirds larger than
without the training.  Also, education increases participation and contribution rates most powerfully
among non-highly compensated employees, raising participation rates for non-highly compensated
employees by twice as much as for highly compensated employees.   It also turns out that providing
specifically tailored communication about a particular company’s plan has much the same positive
impact;  the most potent effect is for in-person seminars over written plan materials, and frequent
seminars increase participation significantly.   A related finding is that retirement education appears to be
strongly influencing retirement wealth and savings flows, but it is not related to respondents’ total net
worth.  In other words, employer-provided retirement education produces wholesale changes in saving
behavior, and not just small changes at the margin.
There are two potential concerns associated with employer education.  The first, that a significant fraction
of the U.S. workforce is not currently covered by employer-sponsored plans, even though this is the
population segment that arguably most needs financial education.  The second concern is that employers
have a continuing concern regarding fiduciary liability.  This arises if companies providing financial
education end up taking on some risk when participants complain about pension plan performance. Since
the courts are currently hearing legal arguments on this point, it is likely that employers will proceed
somewhat cautiously on the financial education front for the near future.
Financial Advice
A great deal of investment advice is proffered to investors by the large and growing industry of financial
advisors.  This group generally advises conservative investors to hold the majority of their assets in bonds,7
while aggressive investors are encouraged to hold stock.  But is such advice sought, and if sought,
heeded?  Unfortunately, it appears that the average American saver has a long way to go in becoming a
savvy investor.
Evidence on this point is summarized in Table 1, and shows that only than half of a nationally
representative survey of American households questioned sought financial advice.  Of those, the vast
majority (57%)  obtained information from relatives and friends.  Only a quarter of the people contacted a
financial professional for financial advice including bankers (26%), brokers and accountants (17 and
14%), and tax advisers and lawyers (9 and 11% respectively).  Differences by income level are not
surprising:  people earning $25,000 or less were far more likely to consult friends and relatives than
average, while higher-paid respondents were much more likely to go to brokers, bankers, and accountants.
(Similar differences were observed by wealth level).
-- Table 1 --
When responses about peoples’ sources of advice are then linked with information on their financial
portfolios, several interesting conclusions emerge (holding constant age, education, earnings, sex,
ethnicity, retirement and marital status):
 Households indicating they obtained any financial advice had more types of financial assets.  The
positive effect of friends/relatives and brokers on diversification was stronger than for other types of
advice.
• Households reporting that they relied on friends and relatives had saving rates that did not differ from
non-users.  On the other hand, those consulting brokers had higher-than-average saving rates; in
some cases,  people who used bankers and lawyers had lower-than-average saving rates.
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• Households getting financial advice held 25% more assets in stocks and mutual funds, and the
positive effect was strongest for those working with brokers.
Why people obtaining financial advice should save differently, and in particular why brokers should have
the strongest effect on saving rates and asset diversification, remains to be determined.  A possible
explanation for the phenomenon might be that brokers are able to explain risk and return patterns to
financially naïve investors in a way that influences their investment patterns.
Asset Allocation/Investment Patterns
It has long been conventional wisdom that defined benefit pension plans tend to hold far more of their
portfolio in equities than do defined contribution pension plans, perhaps because of the expectation that
individual participants are more risk-averse than are group pension trustees.  However, a glance at Table 2
indicates how wrong this common perception has become in the 1990’s.
-- Table 2--
Specifically, large single-employer defined benefit pension plans hold about half their assets in equities, a
fraction not very different from the current holdings of defined contribution plans.  Though these figures
depend somewhat on when the data were collected and by which group, the defined benefit/defined
contribution equity fractions are around 60%., with the fixed income holdings falling to around 30% (with
the rest in cash and other assets). In general, the message is one of similarities rather than discrepancies
across pension plan type.
Based on this finding, it seems that excessive conservatism among defined contribution investors is
currently not a matter for substantial concern.  Overall, in fact, the results suggest that defined9
contribution asset allocation patterns are roughly consistent with those suggested by the financial press
for the moderately risk averse investor described above.   One reason that this might be true now, although
less true in the past, is that participants in defined contribution pension plans have moved away from
guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) over time.  In 1996, for instance, GIC representation was almost
40% lower than in 1990.   Another reason for the higher-than-anticipated current concentration of stocks
in defined contribution pension portfolios is that “[a]s the stock market rises, participants don’t
necessarily rebalance their 401(k) asset allocations the way pension executives rebalance defined benefit
plan allocations”.3 This suspicion is confirmed with a glance at the figures in Table 2, above.  In 1983,
the typical large defined contribution pension held 39% of its fund in equities; a decade later, that fraction
had risen to 45%. By contrast, defined benefit equity holdings either held constant or fell slightly,
according to the survey information.
A more detailed investigation of this conclusion is warranted since averages conceal important details.
For example, knowing whether asset allocation patterns differ across the population according to
sociodemographic traits might be a first step toward asking whether these patterns are intentional or
accidental.  To this end, the first panel of Table 3 reveals asset allocation patterns by age from a survey of
24 large employers with 401(k) pension plans covering 36,000 employees.
-- Table 3 --
One interesting finding is that workers over age 60 hold little of their retirement portfolio in equities –
less than 15% – while people younger than 40 buy stock or stock funds with close to half of their 401(k)
money.  The all-employee average for the sample was 34% of assets held in stock, including stock funds,
company stock, and international stock funds. The overall inverse relation between age and equity holding
suggests less risk aversion among the younger population, although even people in their 40’s were found
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to hold as much as 40% in equities in their 401(k) plan.  Conversely, assets held in fixed-income
investments rose from about 40% for people in their 20’s, to more than double that for people over age 60.
Asset allocation patterns may also be viewed in relation to participant earnings, as indicated in the second
panel of Table 3.  Here the average employee is seen to devote half his pension contribution to stock
funds, or as much as 64% on equities if the other two stock categories are included.  Interestingly, those
earning up to $60,000 put at least half of their investments in balanced income funds; only those in the
top brackets (earning  over $60,000) invest less than half of their money in the balanced fund (and instead
emphasize pure equity funds).  Fixed income holdings represent a relatively small portfolio fraction, never
above 20%, but the fraction rises with pay.  The lower-paid group is less likely to invest in any form of
corporate stock than the higher-paid, yet the low-wage group still devotes a third of the portfolio or more
to stock.  It is possible, of course, that high earners buy equities early in life and bonds later to offset
depreciating human capital, while low earners have less reason to buy equities to offset human capital
risk.
Asset allocation patterns may also be analyzed by gender, which is described in the last panel of Table 3.
In this survey, at least, men and  women behave quite similarly:  pension accumulations as well as new
contributions devoted to equities stand at about 50%, and fixed income amounts at about  40-45%, for
both sexes.  In other words, this survey suggests that plan participants in the private sector 401(k)
pensions are following the “moderate investor” advice recommended in the industry, and the results do
not differ by sex.
RETIREMENT ASSET DECUMULATION
In addition to looking at the retirement asset accumulation phase, we also examined what influences asset
decumulation patterns in retirement.  Among the most prominent factors are people’s expectations about11
the future – their own anticipated longevity, the probability of poor health and need for nursing home
care, and future macroeconomic variables including inflation and interest rates.  Taxes and government
benefit programs probably also play a powerful role in asset decumulation patterns.  In addition, people’s
risk aversion and discount rates are also likely to influence how they hold retirement assets and how
quickly they draw down their assets in old age.
One way to explore workers’ and retirees’ expectations would exploit the HRS survey, since it asked
respondents about anticipated life expectancy, inflation rates, as well as risk aversion.  Because the data
have just begun to be examined, we only have initial results, one of which suggests older people seem to
have a quite accurate estimate of their own life expectancy.  By comparing self-reported longevity
probabilities with actuarial life tables, it can be concluded that both men and women seem to quite
accurately assess their own chances of survival to age 75 and 85.
Also of interest is the conclusion that HRS respondents expecting to live longer than average have
accumulated more than average assets.  This indicates that there is quite likely a link between saving and
anticipated retirement needs.  Future research will be able to determine whether those expecting to live
longer than average also handle their asset decumulation differently – for example, by drawing down their
wealth more slowly, by buying annuities, and by having pensions of the defined benefit rather than the
defined contribution variety. Future research will link people’s anticipated health problems, forecasts of
macroeconomic variables, risk aversion, and discount rates to saving patterns as well.
Asset Decumulation and Annuitization
Several other factors also influence asset decumulation patterns, including the relative price of holding
different assets and unwinding them. One important issue is the cost of annuities available for purchase in
the marketplace, and in decades past there has been much concern over the administrative costs as well as12
adverse selection loading implicit in annuity pricing. But recent research suggests that adverse selection
and insurance loads have declined of late, making this insurance product much more favorable to retirees
reaching retirement age in years to come.
On a related note, retirees in years gone by tended to be covered mainly under defined benefit pension
plans, but increasingly workers and retirees now hold a defined contribution accumulation.  Not only have
plan types changed, but features of existing plans have also adapted to competitive pressures.  Thus until
recently, defined benefit pensions required retirees to take an annuity payout, but in the last decade
employer surveys show that they are allowing eligible retirees to receive increasing portions of their
benefits in lump-sums at retirement.  Of course, in defined contribution plans, lump sum cashouts have
always been the norm.
This switch from defined benefit to defined contribution plans represents a change in risk-bearing patterns
for retirees.  As compared to employees in defined benefit plans, defined contribution retirees face two
different sources of risk.  The first is that they directly bear the risk of their portfolio’s investment
performance after retirement.  If asset performance is sub-par, retirees must reduce consumption or reduce
depleting their assets.  The second is longevity risk.  Unlike DB retirees who typically received annuities
until death, the DC retiree who does not annuitize faces the risk of outliving his assets – even if returns
are strong.  That is, annuitization of retirement wealth  provides a means of pooling longevity risk.  This
becomes a matter of even greater concern should proposed changes to Social Security convert part of the
federal  system into a national defined contribution account, since the need for retirement annuitization
will be further exacerbated.
One question that remains to be studied is how pension-covered workers are responding to the new
availability of pension lump sums.  Policymakers’ concern has been that people might pervert the intent of
the pension system by spending the money unwisely.   To discourage such behavior, the federal
government has levied an excise tax on pension funds distributed before the recipient is age 55; someone13
withdrawing his fund early pays this penalty plus income tax on the amount.  Research on the effect of
this excise tax suggests that low-income recipients are not deterred much from cashing out their lump
sums, but  higher income workers are discouraged from taking the funds prior to retirement.  It also
appears that the higher the value of the pension lump sum amount, the more likely a participant is to roll
it over into a tax qualified account rather than spend it.
In any event, the important question remains as to how people are investing their rollover and lump sum
pensions during the retirement phase.  Though no systematic research casts light on the subject, anecdotal
evidence suggests that most workers who are granted the option of taking cash from their pension
accounts are doing so, rather than purchasing life annuities through group retirement plans.  This is
surprising, and somewhat discomfiting, since an employer-provided group life annuity would tend to be
priced at group rates below those available to individual purchasers of annuities (for adverse selection
reasons as well as because of scale economies).  The size of the group discount would of course vary with
group characteristics;  on the other hand, group administration and overhead costs are about half those
associated with individually-priced annuities.
When thinking about annuity issues there is another matter that needs to be more fully recognized, which
is that people seem to be increasingly likely to buy guaranteed-period certain options rather than simple
life annuities.  This is evident in a recent survey of higher education faculty and researchers, which shows
that participants are increasingly likely to select 10-year and 20-year certain options, rather than single
life annuities preferred in the past.  In addition, people now tend to hold their defined contribution
accruals as a variable annuity into retirement rather than taking a fixed annuity payout, notwithstanding
the additional capital market risk imposed on the retiree by this strategy.
Putting these trends together, it appears increasingly likely for pensioners to lay claim on part or all of
their pension assets without annuitizing them, in contrast to common practice in years past.  If this trend
continues, it suggests that ever larger segments of retiree wealth will move into the nonannuitized, and14
potentially bequeathable category; this will place increasing responsibility on retirees to manage the
decumulation phase more carefully than ever before.
The evidence suggests that potential markets for annuity products that have been largely untapped are
concentrated among the middle three-fifths of the income distribution.  Traditional marketing has focused
largely on high net wealth individuals in the top income quintile who can generate large dollar purchases
and sizable single-sale commissions.  While this market may not be tapped out, it is relatively crowded.
Therefore an opportunity and a challenge for the life insurance industry is to develop and market annuity
products that can be sold to a large middle market with small individual scale.  Successful products will
likely be highly standardized to minimize cost.  Marketing of these products likely will focus on already
existing collectives of individual purchasers such as 401(k) plans.  Ties to these sorts of institutions will
enable insurers to heighten needed saving education among participants and also to alert savers to the role
of annuities in the decumulation phase.
CHANGING FORTUNES IN RETIREMENT PRODUCTS
The discussion thus far shows just how much the world has changed.  Not too long ago, a listing of
retirement assets would have been quite short.  Pensions offered by large firms made up the bulk of non-
government retirement assets, with most individuals relying on banks or retail mutual funds for additional
assets earmarked for decumulation after retirement.   What has changed during the second half of this
century is that a number of tax-advantaged retirement asset categories developed, assets that now
constitute the bulk of retirement savings.  We begin our examination of the dynamics of this product
market by starting with the old standard, the pension fund market.   A more detailed discussion of each of
these points appears in the companion study by Hoffman and Santomero.15
Pension Assets
The term “pension” was at one time synonymous with a corporate pension plan which was provided solely
by a worker's employer.   This category was divided between defined benefit  (DB) plans, where
contributions are variable and the benefits are fixed , and defined contribution , (DC) plans, where
contributions are fixed and benefits variable.   It is on the defined contribution side where the picture can
be a little opaque.  In many cases the employee is able to  contribute with the corporation matching  these
contributions to some degree.   This employee aspect has become increasingly important in recent years .
Therefore, it has become difficult to divide the retirement market strictly into employer and employee
sectors.  We will proceed with this in mind.
Over the period from 1980 to 1993 , the combined assets of  private sector DB and DC plans grew from
$563.6 billion to $2.3 trillion; s ee Table 4. 4   Insurance company and IRA figures - which are usually
reported separately - increase the total to $4 trillion.   With inflation and wealth ever increasing  over this
period, these figures do not convey much more than that market size has grown precipitously.   Therefore,
we report the combined market benchmarked against total wealth.   In this case, the sector can be seen to
have risen from 11% in 1983 to 14% in 1995. As can be seen in Table 5, the general trend has been
upward with the single exception of the period following 1985.
--- Table 4 and 5 ---
In is important to note that this  gradual upward drift in private retirement pension plan assets  conceals a
dynamic shift in the makeup of this sector.  In particular, there has been a dramatic reallocation away  from
defined benefit  pensions toward defined contribution plans.   In 1980, defined benefit assets were 2.5 times
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from Form 5500 filings with the IRS.  The process has not been automated and is therefore subject to a
lengthy delay of approximately three years.  Public sector plan assets are not discussed here in detail.16
that of defined contribution  assets.  By 1993,  the last date available, defined benefit  assets were only 1.17
times that of defined contribution  plans.  The trends indicate that the two plans are likely nearly at parity
at present.  Evidence described in our report illustrates that DC programs have substantially replaced
these DB plans within the corporate pension fund market over this period.  This is true even while the
total is declining as a percentage of wealth.  This result is hidden by the dramatic increase in 401(k)
assets.
 Individual Retirement Accounts
During the period 1984 to 1993, individual retirement account assets rose impressively from 10% to 23%
of total pension assets (Table 6).  Due to changes in the tax code, contributions have fallen considerably
since their peak in 1985.  Therefore, the increase in total IRA assets can be attributed to appreciation in
asset value, lump sum rollovers and the expanded use of IRA accounts in the nascent Simplified Employee
Pension (SEP) market.
-- Table 6 --
The four main institutional players in the IRA market are: depository institutions (commercial banks,
thrifts, and credit unions), investment brokerage firms, mutual fund complexes, and life insurance
companies.  Table 7 demonstrates the dramatic changes in relative share experienced by these institutions
in the last ten years.  Mutual funds and brokerages have made sizable inroads into depository institutions’
share.  Depository institutions have seen their share decline from 61% in 1985 to 21% in 1995.  Mutual
funds and brokerages have picked up 40% of this drop: mutual funds increasing from 16% to 35% and
brokerages from 15% to 36%.  Part of this change can likely be explained by the greater general long-term
appreciation of equities.  Nonetheless, notice that insurance companies have retained a small and
relatively flat share, hovering around 8%.17
-- Table 7 --
IRA contribution rates are very sensitive to changes in the tax code.  At present, the tax milieu is
relatively unfavorable, so contributions have remained low.  The majority of fee income is, therefore, to be
derived from management of this huge asset pool.  Changes in relative institutional share will likely be
dependent upon making inroads into the rollover market, and the new SEP-IRA market, but the data
suggests depositories are clearly losing share to the equity market alternatives offered by mutual fund
complexes and brokerage firms.
A recent study of IRA contributions from 1987 to 1990 found that for every newly initiated rollover
account, contributions were continued in 3.85 existing accounts.  The pattern is reversed if we look at
dollar amounts.  A typical rollover account has an annual contribution of 3.21 times that of a regular
account.  Of course, this figure is statistically misleading since it incorporates the large initial amount.
Nonetheless, both the number of accounts and the dollar amounts moved in favor of rollover accounts
during this period.  The ratio of existing accounts to rollover accounts decreased from 4.92:1 in 1987 to
3:1 in 1990.  The dollar ratio of rollovers to regular contributions increased from $1.99:$1 to $4.58:$1. 5
A similar trend regarding the increasing percentage of IRA funds attributed to rollovers can be seen in the
mutual fund market.  During the period from 1992 to 1994, rollover assets increased from 27% to 34 % of
total IRA assets. 6
Consequently, one way insurance firms can potentially gain market share here is by being more aggressive
in the rollover competition.  This implies a need to be more responsive to the desires of retail customers to
participate in equity ownership, as fixed rate asset choices seem to be losing market share to equity
participation according to the data.
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6 National Underwriter, Life & Health/Financial Services Edition , January 29, 1996, p. 7.18
401(K) Accounts
This segment of the retirement market is currently slightly less than 70 % of IRA balances.  As of year-
end 1993, total assets were $616.3 billion.  With the downturn in IRA contributions, 401(k) accounts have
rapidly taken up the slack.  As noted above, annual contributions have risen uninterrupted from 1986 to
1994.  Unlike IRAs, both contributions and asset levels have increased rapidly.  This has led to an
increasing share of the total assets of the pension market.  In 1984, 401(k) accounts represented only 7%
of total retirement assets.  By 1993, their share had risen to 17% (see Table 6 which uses the higher
figures from the Department of Labor).
Data on the institutional makeup of the 401(k) market are sparse since the mutual fund industry is the
only industry that regularly reports its market share.  Between 1986 and 1994, mutual funds saw their
401(k) share rise from 8 % to 31%.  The rapid growth in the 401(k) market provides opportunities for
both new accounts and maintenance of outstanding accounts for all segments of the financial sector.
As with IRAs, rollovers are another avenue by which to make market inroads.  However, in both cases,
success of the insurance industry depends upon their ability to offer individuals products which permit
access to equity participation, and offer a wide range of investment options.  Depository institutions have
been losing market share in these two markets precisely because they have not offered their customers a
wide range of investment options.  The insurance industry cannot afford to make the same mistake.
Annuities
Annuities represent the second largest segment of the retirement market. In the last year in which
aggregate totals are available, 1993, annuities held 20% of the market (IRAs were first with 23 % and
401(k)s followed with 17%), see Table 6 above.  As would be expected, insurance companies are
dominant in the distribution of this product with a market share in 1993 of 76%. In raw dollar amounts,19
annuity reserves totaled $1.041 trillion, of which insurance companies classified $733.9 billion as being
retirement targeted.  It must be kept in mind that these figures understate retirement annuity totals. Many
individuals make purchases of annuities which are not recorded in the retirement figures because of their
lack of favorable tax treatment.  Table 8 reveals that insurance company annuities have slightly decreased
their share of total retirement assets; from 20% in 1983 to 19% in 1995, peaking in 1988 with 22%. This
trend is a bit misleading because the quantity of annuities which are not tax advantaged is increasing
relative to those that are. Only tax advantaged annuities are classified by insurance companies as being
earmarked for retirement.
-- Table 8 --
Annuities are sold through many avenues in addition to direct sales by insurance companies.  Banks are a
new and increasingly important distribution channel.  An ominous note for life insurance companies is
that their share of initial sales fees may be declining.  Their share of this revenue in the increasingly
popular area of variable annuities was 55% in 1994 and decreased slightly to 43% by 1995.  It is projected
by some to drop to 30% by the year 2000.    This trend could be compounded by the announced intention of
banks to create and market their own annuities, as opposed to merely selling those of insurance
companies.
LIFE INSURERS ’ MARKET SHARE OF PRIVATE RETIREMENT ASSETS
Much has been written about insurance companies’ slipping competitiveness in the retirement asset
market. Overall, between 1983 and 1995, life insurance companies have decreased their share of the
retirement market from 23% to 21% (see Table 9).  In five years, their market share dropped from 26% in
1990 to 21% in 1995.  If allowed to continue, this decline could signal a larger problem for life insurers as
they seek to compete in the marketplace.20
-- Table 9 --
In their traditional stronghold of annuities, life insurers remain strong. Many investment firms and banks
have proclaimed their intention to challenge the insurance industry in this area, but they have yet to do so
with much visible success.  Of greater relevance is the industry’s own need to maintain effectiveness and
cost efficiency in its delivery systems to remain competitive.
The similarity of variable annuities to mutual funds has been a major reason for their success.  But herein
may lie the problem.  Variable annuities tend to have higher fees associated with them than traditional
mutual funds.   As we know, part of these fees go to options such as life insurance attachments and
principal protection.  But, as with load mutual funds, these fees will hurt long-term performance.
Performance may be further affected by poor fund management or, at least, low risk portfolio choices.  As
consumers become more savvy, these performance inhibitors may nullify the value of insurance
attachments and subsequently, variable annuities may lose their commercial luster.
In fact, the success of insurance annuities is somewhat problematic.  Annuity premium income has
eclipsed traditional sources of income such as life and health insurance (see Table 10).  We have seen a
fundamental shift to a dependence on the retirement market.  It is for this reason that insurance
companies should be wary of inroads to their annuity share.
-- Table 10 --
As far as the life industry’s potential in the other areas, the picture is decidedly mixed.  They have slipped
from their IRA market share peak of 11% in 1990  to 8% at year-end 1995.  However, at the same time,
IRA assets’ proportion of insurance company pension assets has increased from 3 % in 1983 to 10% in
1995 (see Table 11).  Therefore, despite losing market share, IRAs have become increasingly important to
insurance companies’ earnings and asset growth as shown by the increasing share of IRA funds set aside21
as part of insurers’ total retirement reserves.  They cannot afford to passively lose this market to the
mutual fund industry, as depositories have done.  They must compete with a wider array of products and
at a competitive fee structure.  Otherwise, their share will follow that of banks and thrifts in the last
decade.
-- Table 11--
Finally, the explosion in the 401(k) market should send a signal to all players in the retirement market
that complacency can lead to missed opportunity.  This area, as with that of IRAs, is marked by rapid
account turnover.  The rollover market is many times larger than that of account initiation.  Perhaps this
is the mechanism through which life insurers can win back market share from mutual funds.  It is clearly
too big to ignore, and a key competitive opportunity for the industry as a whole.  However, it remains to be
seen whether life insurers will accept the challenge.
NEW DYNAMICS , NEW DIRECTIONS
Our overview of the retirement asset market points to several steps that insurers must take to ensure
growth, success and profitability.  The challenges for the industry are to maintain its dominant position in
the annuity market; to recognize that the defined benefit and defined contribution pension categories are
aged markets, subject to relative, if not absolute, decline; and to compete effectively in the new and
growing 401(k) and IRA segments of  the retirement arena.
Insurance companies have seen their share of the retirement assets market slowly erode over the last
decade.  Their niche and strength is annuities. They should be wary of inroads here associated with
delivery system weaknesses or excessive fees.  At the same time, they must look for opportunities for
expansion in the IRA and 401(k) markets.  Opportunity may come via traditional routes, such as the22
rollover market, or by creative avenues, such as product innovation.  In any case, action must be taken to
stabilize their position in the pensions market.  They are not likely to show a disastrous loss in market
share akin to that experienced by depository institutions in the IRA market, but attention should be
directed to shoring up their annuity strength and diversifying to guard against the inefficacy of these
measures. Recognizing their dependency on the retirement market should be a call to arms to fight for
every retirement dollar.
We also find a number of new opportunities for insurers at retail market level. As baby boomers begin to
worry about retirement, they will begin to recognize the saving deficit that they confront in order to
achieve economic security in their old age.  Employers too are identifying new tools to help them build an
environment in which employee retirement saving can be done more sensibly.  All of this requires
powerful efforts to combat deep-rooted financial illiteracy, a problem that plagues the household sector.
This report has noted where the educational efforts are beginning to pay off, and the types of mechanisms
that seem to afford the most promise.  We believe that the middle income market is potentially ready to
make substantial changes in saving patterns, if financial institutions can only provide low-cost, relatively
simple vehicles to achieve this end.   Insurers face potentially great opportunities in this market, yet
substantial challenges in providing retirement accumulation as well as decumulation services to individual
households of rather modest wealth.23
Table 1:  Financial Advice Sought By Average Americans
   Type of Advice Used Among Those Using
% Reporting Source      Friend/
of Financial Advice     Relative     Banker     Broker     Acc’t     Tax Adv.     Lawyer
All             45%        57%           26            17           14             9                11
By Income
<10K         41                          64              29              6             6             1                14
10-25K      47                      61             27             12            9             5                10
25-50K      43                          54              25             19          17           14                  8
50-100K    58                          39              20             42          34             9                11
Source:  Cited in Mitchell and Moore (1997)24
Table 2:  Pension Plan Investment Portfolios by Plan Type
Pension Fund Assets by Asset Type
 as a Fraction of Net Assets
Year Equity Bonds/FI(*) Real Estate Cash Other(+)
I. Private Defined Benefit
   Trusteed Single Employer 1983 45% 27% na 9% 19%
" 1993 42% 27% na 9% 21%
   Greenwich DB Universe 1992 57% 30% 5% 4% 4%
   P&I Top 1000 DB Plans 1992 53% na
" 1995 56% 34%
" 1996 57% 33%
   Large (>100Ees) 1993 46% 38% na 6% 10%
II. Private Defined
Contribution
  Trusteed Single Employer 1983 39% 22% na 15% 24%
" 1993 45% 23% na 13% 19%
  Greenwich DC Universe 1992 50% 40% 0% 8% 3%
  Greenwich 401(k) Universe 1992 47% 43% 7% 2% 8%
   P&I Top 1000 DC Plans 1992 48% na
" 1995 52% 33%
" 1996 60% 30%
  Large (>100Ees) 1993 45% 33% na 8% 14%
III. Private Multiemployer
   Trusteed 1993 39% 36% na 9% 16%
IV. Public Defined Benefit
   Greenwich DB Universe 1992 44% 44% 6% 5% 8%
V. Public Defined Contribution
   Greenwich DC Universe 1992 33% 54% 8% 5% 9%
Notes:
(*) Includes GIC's and Insured funds.
(+) Totals may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
Source:  Mitchell and Moore (1997)25
Table 3:  401(k) Assets In Specified Investment Holdings by Participant Age and Income
            Plan Participant Age
Investment Category 21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 - 60 >60 Total
Stock Fund 39% 36% 30% 22% 10% 25%
Company Stock 11 9 6 6 3 6
International Stock 3 3 4 3 1 3
Balanced 6 8 11 8 1 8
Fixed Income 41 43 49 62 85 58
Plan Participant Earnings ($K )
Investment Category <15 15-25 25-35 35-45 45-60 60-75 75-100 Total
Stock Fund 25% 22% 20% 19% 25% 42% 45% 52%
Company Stock 7 8 8 7 7 11 8 2
International Stock 1 1 2 2 2 4 6 10
Balanced 62 63 62 67 53 32 26 27
Fixed Income 6 7 9 7 12 11 15 8
Source:  Goodfellow and Scheiber (forthcoming), cited in Mitchell and Moore (1997)
Investment Category         Past Accumulation                New Contribution Allocation
                                                        Men                     Women                Men                     Women
Diversified Equity Index 14% 13% 42% 44%
Employer Stock 41 42 19 17
Fixed Income 45 45 39 40
Source:  Bajtelsmit and Vanderhei, cited in Mitchell and Moore (1997)26
Table 4
Assets of Private Pension Plans (Excluding Ins. Cos.)
($ Billions)
DB DC Total
1980 401.455 162.096 563.551
1981 444.376 184.540 628.916
1982 553.419 235.567 788.986
1983 642.359 281.111 923.470
1984 700.669 343.922 1044.591
1985 826.117 426.622 1252.739
1986 895.073 487.837 1382.910
1987 877.269 525.219 1402.488
1988 911.982 591.653 1503.635
1989 987.971 687.626 1675.597
1990 961.904 712.236 1674.140
1991 1101.987 834.284 1936.271
1992 1146.798 947.289 2094.087
1993 1248.180 1068.092 2316.272
Source:  Cited in Hoffman and Santomero (1997)
Table 5
Total Private Retirement Assets Related To Total Wealth
($ Billions)
Pension Assets Wealth Pension Share
1983 1184.725 11158.700 10.62%
1984 1327.515 12407.500 10.70%
1985 1694.075 14443.300 11.73%
1986 1850.990 16557.600 11.18%
1987 1987.520 17802.600 11.16%
1988 2174.255 19457.400 11.17%
1989 2545.190 21466.400 11.86%
1990 2675.200 22230.800 12.03%
1991 3037.950 24481.100 12.41%
1992 3327.415 26066.700 12.77%
1993 3702.675 28326.100 13.07%
1994 3911.560 29508.800 13.26%
1995 4593.560 33541.900 13.69%
Source:  Cited in Hoffman and Santomero (1997)27
Table 6
Instrument Share of the Retirement Asset Market
(Percent)
IRA  401(k) Annuity
1984 9.93% 6.91% 20.98%
1985 11.72% 8.50% 19.58%
1986 14.89% 9.87% 21.12%
1987 16.79% 10.84% 21.94%
1988 18.08% 12.74% 22.39%
1989 18.25% 14.03% 21.08%
1990 19.76% 14.39% 22.24%
1991 21.63% 14.49% 21.81%
1992 22.42% 16.62% 20.45%
1993 23.43% 16.65% 19.82%
Source:  Cited in Hoffman and Santomero (1997)
Table 7
Institutional Share of the IRA Market
Depository Inst. Brokerages Mutual Funds Insurance Cos.
1985 61.00% 14.70% 15.80% 8.50%
1986 56.50% 16.20% 19.40% 7.90%
1987 52.30% 17.40% 21.40% 8.90%
1988 51.60% 17.30% 21.90% 9.20%
1989 47.90% 17.60% 24.00% 10.50%
1990 45.20% 19.90% 24.10% 10.80%
1991 39.20% 27.50% 25.70% 7.60%
1992 34.10% 30.10% 28.30% 7.50%
1993 28.00% 31.30% 32.70% 8.00%
1994 25.50% 33.70% 32.40% 8.40%
1995 21.30% 35.50% 35.20% 8.00%
Source:  Cited in Hoffman and Santomero (1997)28
Table 8
Insurance  Co. Annuities- Share of the Private Retirement Market
Ins. Annuities Total Reserves Ins. Annuity Share
1983 241.439 1184.725 20.38%
1984 278.487 1327.515 20.98%
1985 331.731 1694.075 19.58%
1986 390.986 1850.990 21.12%
1987 436.095 1987.520 21.94%
1988 486.779 2174.255 22.39%
1989 536.459 2545.190 21.08%
1990 594.869 2675.200 22.24%
1991 662.466 3037.950 21.81%
1992 680.534 3327.415 20.45%
1993 733.931 3702.675 19.82%
1994 775.934 3911.560 19.84%
1995 854.539 4593.560 18.60%
Source:  Cited in Hoffman and Santomero (1997)
Table 9
Insurance Company Share of the Private Retirement Market
($ Billions)
Ins. Pension Reserves Total Assets Ins. Co. Share
1983 269.425 1184.725 22.74%
1984 313.215 1327.515 23.59%
1985 373.475 1694.075 22.05%
1986 441.390 1850.99 23.85%
1987 495.420 1987.52 24.93%
1988 562.155 2174.255 25.86%
1989 624.290 2545.19 24.53%
1990 695.700 2675.2 26.01%
1991 745.950 3037.95 24.55%
1992 768.215 3327.415 23.09%
1993 825.375 3702.675 22.29%
1994 878.460 3911.56 22.46%
1995 972.560 4593.56 21.17%
Source:  Cited in Hoffman and Santomero (1997)29
Table 10
Premium Income of Life Insurance Companies
($ Billions)
Life Ins. Annuities Health Ins. Total Life Annuity Health
1983 50.265 30.544 38.201 119.010 42.24% 25.67% 32.10%
1984 51.274 42.859 40.671 134.804 38.04% 31.79% 30.17%
1985 60.127 53.899 41.837 155.863 38.58% 34.58% 26.84%
1986* 66.213 83.712 44.153 194.078 34.12% 43.13% 22.75%
1987 76.737 88.677 47.549 212.963 36.03% 41.64% 22.33%
1988 73.531 103.278 52.306 229.115 32.09% 45.08% 22.83%
1989 73.290 114.997 56.079 244.366 29.99% 47.06% 22.95%
1990 76.692 129.064 58.254 264.010 29.05% 48.89% 22.07%
1991 79.301 123.590 60.900 263.791 30.06% 46.85% 23.09%
1992 83.868 132.645 65.545 282.058 29.73% 47.03% 23.24%
1993 94.448 156.445 68.658 319.551 29.56% 48.96% 21.49%
1994 96.271 153.850 76.221 326.342 29.50% 47.14% 23.36%
1995 98.925 159.935 80.352 339.212 29.16% 47.15% 23.69%
Source:  Cited in Hoffman and Santomero (1997)
Table 11
IRA Share of Insurance Co. Pension Assets
($ Billions)
Ins. IRA Pension Reserves IRA Share
1983 8.995 269.425 3.34%
1984 12.550 313.215 4.01%
1985 16.955 373.475 4.54%
1986 22.650 441.390 5.13%
1987 30.085 495.420 6.07%
1988 38.850 562.155 6.91%
1989 37.855 624.290 6.06%
1990 41.975 695.700 6.03%
1991 49.690 745.950 6.66%
1992 55.600 768.215 7.24%
1993 69.465 825.375 8.42%
1994 78.735 878.460 8.96%
1995 94.295 972.560 9.70%
Source:  Cited in Hoffman and Santomero (1997)